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Government Size and 
Economic Growth: 
Japan's Government 
Reforms and Evidence 
from OECD 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relationship between govern-
ment size and economic growth of 21 industrialized countries. Govern-
ment size is measured by government final consumption expenditures 
and transfer payments. The relationship between government consump-
tion is expected to increase GDP growth for developing countries, and 
reduce it for industrialized countries. Government consumption can con-
tribute to increased economic growth. However, government consump-
tion is likely to expand beyond an efficient level in industrialized 
countries. In contrast, transfer payments, and social welfare programs 
are likely to reduce economic growth for most countries. These pro-
grams reduce work incentives and encourage tax avoidance activities. 
Work disincentives and tax avoidance reduce economic growth. These 
expected relationships are consistent with economic performance and 
government size for the countries considered here. Inefficiency and 
excessive government growth are checked by voter feedback as tax bur-
dens exceed the associated benefits. Unfortunately, government pro-
gram costs and benefits are asymmetrically distributed. The resulting 
tendency is to expand government programs, particularly programs that 
benefit a majority of voters at the expense of a minority. This tendency 
becomes even more acute as the tax system becomes more progressive 
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(i.e., tax burdens become concentrated. Reductions in government size 
are more likely with stagnant or declining economic growth, and in gov-
ernment programs whose costs are widely shared, compared to pro-
grams with widely shared benefits and narrowly shared costs. 
The Japanese bureaucracy has been highly touted for its efficiency and effec-
tiveness by many observers.1 After all, it presided over a spectacular economic 
growth that led Japan out of the ruin of World War II to its economic superpower 
status of today. The Japanese economy enjoys the second highest GDP, the highest 
GDP per capita, stable prices and low unemployment relative to other major indus-
trialized countries.2 In addition, life expectancy is among the highest, and infant 
mortality the lowest among all OECD countries.3 However, Japan's robust eco-
nomic position has recently shown weaknesses. Since the collapse of the bubble 
economy in 1991, average real annual economic growth has remained 0.7% 
through 1996, the longest stagnation in postwar Japan.4 
Currently, the government bureaucrats seem not only incapable of invigorating 
the economy, but have possibly prolonged the stagnation with their outdated man-
agement practices. A flurry of scandals involving high ranking bureaucrats and 
Japan's slow and ineffective handling of crises such as oil-tanker spills in the Sea 
of Japan, the Kobe earthquake and the terrorist siege at the Japanese ambassador's 
residence in Peru, have prompted Japanese citizens to reexamine role of govern-
ment and reevaluate their hitherto benevolent view of their bureaucracy. No longer 
is the bureaucracy seen as the solution to the problems; it is the problem. 
This paper will briefly examine the characteristics of the Japanese bureaucracy 
and its role in Japan's economic ascendancy. We find that, despite the Japanese 
government's "activist" reputation, the size of the government has been remark-
ably small in terms of government employment and total government disburse-
ments. Government disbursements include both government final consumption 
expenditures and transfer payments, including social security and welfare pay-
ments. Examining comparable data for other G7 countries shows a consistent rela-
tionship between government size and the country's macroeconomic performance. 
The data suggest smaller government size is correlated with faster GDP growth, 
smaller unemployment and lower inflation. This raises a basic question: is govern-
ment size, and not the quality of public management, the key factor in determining 
the "efficacy" of public management? This paper explores both analytical and 
empirical aspects of this question for mature industrial countries. 
JAPANESE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Japan's economic performance since 1961 has been quite remarkable. Its real GDP 
growth has averaged 5. 7% annually, while the unemployment rate remained around 
2 % and inflation around 4. 7%. Compared with other major industrialized countries, 
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Table 1. Economic Performance of G7 Countries (1961-1996) 
Japan Canada France Germany Italy 
Growth Rate 5.7% (1)2 3.7% (2) 3.2%(4) 2.9%(5) 3.4% (3) 
Unemployment 2.0% (1) 7.6% (7) 6.2%(5) 3.5% (2) 5.5% (3) 
Inflation 4.7% (2) 5.2%(4) 6.0%(5) 3.4% (1) 8.6%(7) 
Notes: 1. 1961·1990 figures reflect former West Germany, and 1991 -1996 figures reflect united Germany. 
2. The numbers in parenthesis denote the country's relative ranking for each measure. 
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Figure 1. Relative Growth of Real GDP Among G7 Countries 
Japan has achieved the highest growth at a relatively low cost of inflation and 
unemployment. For example, Canada, the country with the second highest GDP 
growth, averaged 7.6% unemployment and 5.2% inflation, as shown in Table 1. 
A closer examination of Japanese growth, however, shows that the annual growth 
rate has steadily declined during this 35 year period, along with growth in all other 
countries. In the 1960s, Japan averaged 12% annual growth, more than double the 
rate achieved by Italy, the G7 country with the second highest growth rate. Japan's 
growth during this period was rather extraordinary, considering the average growth 
rate for the remaining G7 nations was a mere 4.5% during this period. This high 
growth rate partially reflects Japan's catch-up status in the early 1960s. 
In the 1970s, Japan's average annual growth dropped to 4.6%, barely above 
Canada, the G7 country with the second highest average annual growth rate. The 
oil embargo and resulting high energy costs reduced Japan's growth more than any 
other G7 country. In the 1980s, Japan's average annual growth was 4.2%, almost 
50% better than Canada, again the G7 country with the next highest growth rate. 
Japan's growth, however, hit a wall in the 1990s. Its meager 0.7% average annual 
growth, for this period, is the second to the lowest among G7 countries. It is half 
the U.S. growth rate, the highest among G7 countries for this period. 
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Source: OECD, National Accounts: Aggregate Tables, Volume 1, Table 1. 
Figure 2. Relative Growth of Real GDP Among G7 Countries 
Table 2. Economic Performance of Selected Countries (1991-1996) 
Japan Canada France Germany1 Italy UK USA 
Growth Rate 0.7o/o (SJ 1 1.2% (2J 0.7%(SJ 0.8% (4J 0.6% (6J 1-1% (3) 1.4% (1 J 
Unemployment 3.2% (1) 11.3% (SJ 12.4% (7) 10.2% (3) 12.2% (6) 10.So/o (4) 7.So/o (2J 
Inflation 0.7% (1) 1.4% (2J 2.0% (3) 2-7% (4J 4.S% (7J 2-7% (4) 2.9% (6) 
Note: 1. The numbers in parenthesis denote the country's relative ranking for each measure. 
Source: Economic Report of the President (1987-1997), Money Watch, Long Term Credit Bank, May 1997. 
Table 2 shows the growth, unemployment and inflation rates for G7 nations 
between 1991 and 1996. Although Japan's unemployment and inflation still rank as 
the best among the G7 countries, Japan's GDP growth rate has remained one of the 
lowest, a first for the post-war era. The precipitous fall in Japan's economic perfor-
mance from the giddy heights of the late 1980s to its current relative status is 
prompting close attention. 
The destruction of both consumer confidence and asset values in the 1990 land 
and stock market collapse is clearly one of the major factors in this prolonged stag-
nation. In May of 1989, the Bank of Japan reversed its two year old easy monetary 
policy to curb rampant property and stock speculation. As shown in Table 3, the 
official discount rate increased from 2.5% to 3.25%; it continued to increase for the 
next 15 months, peaking at 6% in August 1990. It remained 6%, the highest rate in 
ten years, for next 11 months. The tight monetary policy curbed property and stock 
market speculation, but it also created a lengthy recession. The economy remained 
in the doldrums for much of the 1990s, despite dramatic expansionary fiscal and 
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Table 3. Changes in Official Discount Rate 
Date Discount Rate Date Discount Rate 
1981 March 18 6.25% 1990 March 20 5.25% 
December 11 5.5% August 30 6.0% 
1983 October 22 5.0% 1991 July 1 5.5% 
1986 January 30 4.5% November 14 5.0% 
March 10 4.0% December 30 4.5% 
April 21 3.5% 1992 April 1 3.75% 
November 1 3.0% July 27 3.25% 
1987 February 23 2.5% 1993 February 4 2.5% 
1989 May 31 3.25% September 21 1.75% 
October 11 3.75% 1995 April 14 1.0% 
December 25 4.25% Se~tember 8 0.5% 
Source: Money Watch, Long Term Credit Bank, May 1997. 
monetary policies, including a ¥33.6 trillion ($300 billion) fiscal stimuli and the 
lowest discount rates since the end of the World War II. 
Japan's prolonged economic stagnation in the face of expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies has prompted many observers and citizens to seek other expla-
nations for the economy's malaise. This includes examining the elite financial 
bureaucrats' role and policy stewardship, particularly their role in inflating and 
later deflating property and stock values. In part, the current administrative 
reforms are driven by dissatisfaction with the Japanese bureaucracy.5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY 
The Japanese bureaucracy is led by career civil servants, chosen through an 
extremely competitive selection process. They are typically graduates of preemi-
nent universities. A measure of success for these civil servants is to serve in senior 
managerial positions within their respective ministries, particularly in the presti-
gious Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of International Trade and Industries 
(MITI) or Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). As in the private sector, careerists 
are rotated through various positions in the organization to acquaint them with the 
institution's varied aspects, and many hours are spent creating group cohesiveness 
and informal communication networks. Despite the hierarchical organizational 
structure, decisions are effectively made at a relatively low level of the manage-
ment hierarchy. 
In one sense, public management in Japan, as embodied by the MOF, MITI and 
MOFA, should be the envy of all bureaucracies-small and cohesive organizations 
staffed with highly competent and dedicated civil servants. Because the ministries 
face tight budget and manpower constraints, they rely relatively heavily on the pri-
vate and quasi-public sectors for policy implementation and actually producing 
government services. Although reliance on the private and quasi-public sectors 
may have started as an unintended by-product of extreme fiscal conservatism, the 
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resulting institutions have successfully balanced the interests of both the general 
public and the bureaucrats. For the general public, this bureaucratic structure deliv-
ered public services relatively efficiently, which enabled Japan to maintain its low 
tax structure. For the bureaucrats, the emerging private and quasi-public sectors 
provided secure and profitable second career or retirement opportunities. These 
opportunities compensated the bureaucrats for the short, competitive and low pay-
ing nature of many career civil service positions. 
PAST JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS6 
The modem Japanese government has consciously restrained government size 
since the Meiji Restoration of 1868.7 In this view, Japanese bureaucracy has long 
practiced at least some of the tenets of New Public Management Theory, including 
privatization, out-sourcing and decentralization. 8 In postwar Japan, there have 
been three significant administrative reforms prior to Prime Minister Hashimoto's 
current reform: one in 1949, the second in the 1960s and the last in the 1980s. 
Past reforms attempted to limit government size, increase administrative effi-
ciency and promote economic development. They attempted to reduce both per-
sonnel and the budget; simplify the regulation and permit system; and increase the 
bureaucrats' accountability. 
The 1949 Reform 
The 1949 reform instituted restrictive fiscal policies to combat inflation, and 
moved Japan from a postwar priority production system (1946-1948) to a mar-
ket-based economy. Under Joseph Dodge, financial adviser to the Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Powers, a series of measures ("the Dodge Line") were 
initiated. These measures suspended new loans from the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (Fukko Kin'yu Kinko) and eliminated the associated subsidies. This 
reform reduced the number of civil servants from 1.6 million to 1.4 million, cut the 
number of bureaus by 30%, and created a surplus budget. In fact, this balanced 
budget policy became the guiding financial principle of the conservative adminis-
tration, until Keynesian deficit financing was introduced in the early 1960s. 
An unintended consequence of this zeal for fiscal conservatism, however, was 
the start of de facto "privatization" of government functions by creating quasi-pub-
lic corporations. Faced with both increasing investment needs in the growing econ-
omy and the balanced budget restriction placed on the general account budget, the 
Trust Fund in the Ministry of Finance emerged as the "second budget," the source 
of needed loans to the various public and quasi-public corporations. Funds were 
collected from postal savings, the premiums of welfare and national pension plans, 
and other government revenue sources. The distinctly Japanese development of 
this loan program, called "Zai-To," or the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (FILP), 
will be discussed in more detail later. 
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Unlike the direct priority system practiced from 1946 to 1948, the public 
management principle emerging from the 1949 reform emphasized economic 
incentives and a more advisory-oriented style in this transition economy. In 
1952, the Law on Temporary Emergency Adjustment of Demand and Supply 
of Goods expired, marking this transition. The law had given the government 
legal authority to directly allocate key commodities. In contrast, the newly cre-
ated Export-Import Bank (1950) and the Japan Development Bank (1951), 
which were partly financed by FILP, provided below-market interest rates to 
encourage plant investments by key industries. Special tax measures, including 
accelerated depreciation, encouraged both investments in promising new indus-
tries, and rationalization in declining industries. Japan also became an Article 
VIII IMF member in 1964, after liberalizing its trade and foreign exchange 
transactions. 
1960s Reform 
Although Japanese industry became more competitive through accelerated 
investments and a series of market opening-measures, the delayed rationalization 
in the public sector was seen as a major obstacle to further economic growth. In 
1962, the First Provisional Administrative Reform Council (FPARC) was formed 
under Sato Kiichiro, president of Mitsui Bank. Members and staff drawn from the 
business, labor, government and academic communities. Its reform proposal was 
submitted directly ·to Prime Minister Sato in 1964. Some of the proposals were 
implemented by the late 1960s. They included reducing government size by: 
1. Eliminating one bureau in each ministry. 
• 18 bureaus were eliminated in all, representing a 15% reduction. 
2. Adopting a Scrap and Build System. 
• Prohibited new bureaus unless existing bureaus were scrapped. 
3. Limited the personnel in administrative agencies. 
• Reduced personnel from 899,333 in 1967 to 887,022 in 1983. 
1980s Reform 
The Second Provisional Administrative Reform Committee (SP ARC) was cre-
ated in 1981, under the chairmanship of Toshio Doko of Keidanren (Federation of 
Economic Organizations). A philosophy of "neo-liberalism" guided SPARC, 
emphasizing self-reliance, individual and private sector initiatives, reducing both 
government size and its intervention power, and increasing the administration's 
efficiency. The 1980s reform was partly motivated by Japan's mounting public 
debt, which more than doubled in five years, from 15% in 1975 to almost 40% in 
1980, as shown in Figure 3. 
202 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL Vol. 1/No. 2/1998 
¥300,000 60% 
=*" 
'ii ¥250,000 50% 
c: 
·e ¥200,000 40% Q. 0 Q c: ¥150,000 30% CJ 
-0 0 
c ¥100,000 , 20% ..,. 
~ 
iii ¥50,000 10% 
¥0 0% 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
--+--Outstanding Gov't Debt -0-As a % of GDP 
Source: Nihon Tokei Nenkan (Japanese Statistical Year Book) 1970-1996. 
Figure 3. Mounting Public Debt (1960-1993) 
Faced with a declining tax base, associated with an aging population, and 
declining economic growth, the reform emphasized reducing government expendi-
tures and inoculating the country against "advanced country disease." The SPARC 
proposals were submitted to Prime Minister Nakasone in 1982. The First (1983), 
Second (1987) and Third Provisional Councils (1990), promoted and implemented 
the SP ARC reforms. The SPARC proposal included: 
1. Fiscal reconstruction, including reducing government subsidies, personnel and 
expenditures. 
• Under a 'zero ceiling budget,' a 1.8% 1982 budget growth was reduced to 0% 
in 1983, and to a -0.1 % in 1984. 
• The public pension program was reformed in 1985 to reduce the future fiscal 
burden. 
• Previous sharp increases in public debt, growing at a 17% annualized rate, 
declined to 4% annually by the mid-1980s. 
2. Reforming and privatizing public corporations. 
• JNR and NTT were privatized. 
3. Reducing and rationalizing permits, licenses and inspection procedures. 
• This effort was not successful; for example, activities requiring a permit 
increased by 891 from 1985 to 1994 (see Figure 4). 
4. Reinforcing the cabinet's authority over individual ministries and agencies. 
• This effort was also not successful; for example, attempts failed to shift the 
budget-making authority from MOF to the cabinet. 
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In summary, the past reforms attempted to limit government size, increase 
administrative efficiency and promote economic development. Greater success 
was achieved containing government size than in reforming regulatory processes 
or changing the basic bureaucratic structure. The force and the impetus for these 
changes came mainly from the Prime Minister, with strong support from the busi-
ness community. Among the government bureaucracies, the Management and 
Coordination Agency (Somu-cho) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichi-sho) 
have been particularly sensitive to the political executives' interests, as is consis-
tent with their institutional interests, but they often lacked the power to implement 
changes. The Ministry of Finance (MOP), on the other hand, has often played a key 
role in checking the growth of other ministries. The finance ministry's cooperation 
coincides with its institutional interest in furthering fiscal conservatism. 
This public management system, with its superb flexibility, could function 
extremely smoothly and effectively under dedicated and competent bureaucrats. 
The same system, however, could easily be abused for the bureaucrats' benefit, to 
the detriment of the people they serve. Given this bureaucratic structure, it is clear 
why past reforms were only successful in reducing government size, where 
reformers could count on the tacit acquiescence of the MOP, if not on its outright 
support. Equally evident is the reason why regulatory reform failed; this would 

























































Source: Based on OECD, National Accounts: Detailed Tables, Volume 11, Table 15, various countries. 
Figure 5. Government Service Employment as a Percent of Total Employment 
Empirical Support 
Figure 5 shows that Japan has the lowest government employment, relative to 
total employment, among OECD counties. Canada is a close second. Within 
OECD, Scandinavian countries, including Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, have 
the highest proportion of workers engaged in government employment, often 
exceeding 30% of the total employment. France and Germany represent the second 
tier, where government employment hovers around 20%. In recent years, however, 
French government employment has steadily increased to 25% of total employ-
ment, while Germany's percentage has dropped to 15%. Italy, the U.S. and the 
U.K. follow as the third tier, with government employment around 15% of total 
employment. 
Japan's government employment over the last 28 years is shown in Figure 6. 
Comparing the beginning and end of this period, total government employment 
was relatively stable as a percent of total employment; government employment 
accounted for approximately 6.4% of total employment in both 1965 and 1993. 
National government employment has declined throughout this period, both in rel-
ative and absolute terms. The national government employed 834,000 workers in 
1965, which was 1.8% of total employment. This figure fell to 824,000 in 1993, a 
mere 1.3% of total employment. Local government employment increased from 
2.2 million to 3.3 million over the same period. In relative terms, it increased from 
4.7% to 5.1 % of the total employment. However, local government employment 
reached its peak relative to total employment, in 1980. Since 1980, both national 
and local government employment have fallen. This represents the administrative 
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Figure 7. Total Government Disbursements as a Percent of GDP 
reforms initiated by Prime Minister Nakasone, and the succeeding privatization 
initiatives involving the national railway and telephone systems. 
The relatively small size of the Japanese public sector is also illustrated by com-
paring Japan's government disbursements as a percent of GDP to the percentage 
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characterizing other OECD countries (see Figure 7). Government disbursements 
include both government final consumption expenditures and transfer payments 
(e.g., welfare and social security payments). The comparative disbursement pat-
terns in Figure 7 are similar to the comparative employment patterns in Figure 6 
with the exception of Canada and Italy. Government disbursements relative to 
GDP in these two countries are much higher than the government employment fig-
ures might suggest. For the other countries, however, the comparative patterns 
seem to hold. The countries with a relatively high share of government employ-
ment also have a relatively high share of government disbursements. 
REAL GDP GROWTH AND GOVERNMENT SIZE 
Japan's success in maintaining relatively low government employment and dis-
bursements represents a conscious objective of repeated reform initiatives. It is 
natural to ask whether Japan's efforts to limit its government size have contributed 
to its economic well-being. The hypothesis is that decreasing government size will 
increase economic growth. This question will be addressed by looking at the rela-
tionship between government size and economic growth for eight industrialized 
countries, the G7 countries plus Sweden. This section will discuss the theoretical 
basis for expecting an inverse relationship between government size and economic 
growth, summarize past empirical studies, and present new empirical analysis. 
Efficiency and Optimality in Government Programs 
Government expenditures and transfers are typically designed to address market 
failures involving imperfect competition, externalities, public goods and income 
distribution. Government disbursements primarily involve public goods (e.g., 
national security, infrastructure and education) and income redistribution (e.g., 
transfer payments, public health insurance and social security). Imperfect compe-
tition and externalities are primarily addressed through legal and regulatory mech-
anisms (e.g., antitrust law and environmental regulations). All of these activities 
will have an impact on efficiency, economic growth and social welfare (income 
distribution); some positive, others negative. 
For example, government expenditures to provide such public goods as trans-
portation, communication and industrial infrastructure are designed to increase 
economic growth. Similarly, legislative, regulatory and bureaucratic interventions 
to correct negative externalities are intended to increase efficiency; they presum-
ably reduce economic growth for activities creating negative externalities while 
increasing growth for activities affected by the externalities. Alternatively, govern-
ment activities may be inefficient, impose excessive burdens and distort private 
market incentives. 9 If implemented efficiently and at the appropriate level, govern-
ment programs are likely to have the intended effects. If inefficient and 
over-expanded, they are likely to reduce economic growth and social welfare. The 
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relevant question is whether we can expect these policies to be implemented at the 
appropriate level. 10 
As opposed to private market goods, publicly provided goods and services do 
not typically have well defined output or value measures (e.g., how do you mea-
sure the quantity or value of national security or public health?). This makes it dif-
ficult to measure the performance of public sector providers (e.g., how do you 
measure the impact of an additional staff member on the output of national security 
or public health?). In the private sector, the effect of such changes are more readily 
observable in terms of future profits; this feedback enhances production efficiency. 
In contrast, public sector goods and services are typically valued by their produc-
tion costs, and performance is measured by administratively established interme-
diary performance measures (e.g., budget or staff growth). The lack of proper 
output and value measures obscures the proper level of public outlays and the effi-
ciency of those outlays. 11 
In addition, consumers do not pay the full cost of the public goods they con-
sume, and government producers do not have to generate revenues to cover their 
production costs. Costs are typically born by general or specific groups of tax pay-
ers, and tax burdens are not directly related to the value of benefits received. Thus, 
payments for public sector goods and services do not link consumers and produc-
ers in the public sector as prices do in the private sector. 
Combined, these forces will have two effects on publicly provided goods and 
services: reduce efficiency and increase demand. Limited competition and 
non-existent profit motives within government agencies reduce their incentive to 
maximize static efficiency. The separation between consumers and producers, and 
between costs and revenues, increases the demand for public goods and services. 
For given tax and economic growth rates, consumers will tend to demand public 
goods and services beyond the point where the added value justifies the added pro-
duction costs. In addition, producers have an incentive to satisfy the consumers' 
excessive demands. Producers don't have to generate revenues from sales to cover 
their production costs, and expanding output frequently satisfies intermediate per-
formance measures in government agencies. Thus, the actual mix of private market 
and public sector goods and services will likely overemphasize public sector out-
puts relative to the optimal point. 
To the extent that taxes pay for publicly provided goods and services, the tax 
payers' desire to reduce their tax burden provides the primary incentive to increase 
efficiency and limit government outlays. As the level of public goods increases, so 
does the associated tax burden. If the resulting tax burden is considered excessive, 
tax payers will clamor for tax relief. This encourages the public sector to increase 
efficiency and reduce government expenditures. The strength of this counter force 
depends both on how society's tax and public output preferences are transmitted to 
political decision makers and on the distribution of income and the tax burden 
across taxpayers. 12 
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Wolf ( 1988) identifies at least two types of government programs in which voter 
feedback might be ineffective: programs that benefit politically active special 
interest groups but are paid for by a majority of voters (e.g., industry specific pro-
duction subsidies, tariffs and quotas), and programs that benefit the majority but 
are paid for by a minority of voters (social security, national health care and wel-
fare payments in countries with relatively progressive tax systems). 
While voter feedback is imperfect in both cases, it is probably most effective in 
the first case. A majority of the voters bears the costs of these programs. If the 
majority views these programs as excessive, they can vote to change them 
(abstracting from the problems associated with multiple competing issues, incom-
plete information and limited voter turnout). However, control becomes particu-
larly troublesome in cases where the majority benefits at the expense of the 
minority. Even if the voters bearing the burden of these programs consider them 
excessive, they do not have sufficient political power to overcome the majority 
will. The U.S. failure to modify the cost of living adjustment for Social Security 
payments, France's failure to reduce the scope of certain "rights" and the experi-
ences of the "Old Labor" Party in the U.K. all exemplify the difficulty of limiting 
programs benefiting broad population groups at the expense of minority constitu-
encies. These programs may not be limited unless economic performance deterio-
rates sufficiently to justify drastic measures by the majority. 13 
GDP Growth Versus Government Size in Industrialized Countries 
Considering the preceding discussion, there are at least two reasons to expect a 
negative relationship between government size and GDP growth: (i) the tendency 
to over-expand government consumption and investment activity and, (ii) the 
impact on growth of transfer payments and other social welfare programs. While 
many government activities are designed to increase economic growth, they may 
have the opposite effect if they are over-expanded. Consider the example of public 
infrastructure investments. Public infrastructure investments, like private invest-
ment projects, presumably experience diminishing marginal returns. The larger the 
public investment in industrial infrastructure, the lower the return to the last dollar 
invested. To the extent that public and private investments compete for the same 
pool of investment funds (as maintained by the argument that public expenditures, 
including public investment, "crowd out" private investment), public investment 
comes, at least in part, at the expense of private investment. Public investment 
should be expanded to the point where the marginal return to the last dollar 
invested is the same in both public and private investments. If public investment is 
over-expanded, it will have a lower marginal return than private investment. This 
reduces the overall economic growth rate. Thus, over-expanding government 
expenditures can reduce economic growth; as described above, there is a tendency 
to over-expand government expenditures. 14 
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This is the primary impact of government size on economic growth that is cap-
tured by previous empirical studies. Government consumption expenditure data 
generally reflects government spending on public goods (e.g., industrial infrastruc-
ture, defense, education, public health, etc.). Much of this expenditure can be con-
sidered as public capital investment (both physical and human capital). Low levels 
of government consumption expenditures will increase economic growth if the 
marginal productivity of government expenditures is high relative to private mar-
ket investments. As Government consumption expenditures expand, their marginal 
productivity is likely to decrease while the marginal productivity of foregone pri-
vate market opportunities increases. Increasing government consumption expendi-
tures will eventually decrease economic growth. This negative relationship is more 
likely in industrialized countries than in developing or undeveloped countries. 
Industrialized countries have higher government expenditures and a greater stock 
of public capital, both of which reduce the marginal productivity of government 
expenditures. This result is consistent with the empirical findings reported above. 
Transfer payments and other social and corporate welfare (income redistribu-
tion) programs can be expected to reduce economic growth in all countries. In an 
effort to make the distribution of income more equitable (and possibly avert 
growth reducing social unrest), transfer payments and social welfare programs 
shift income from high to low income members of the economy. This redistribu-
tion reduces work incentives for both groups. For high income members, income 
redistribution reduces the effective marginal wage rate. Lower marginal wage rates 
encourage the more successful members of the economy either to work fewer 
hours per year, or, more likely, to retire earlier. Higher marginal tax rates also 
encourage successful individuals to undertake tax avoidance activities that are typ-
ically less productive from society's viewpoint. For low income members, redistri-
bution reduces the cost of not working by providing a social "safety-net," and 
reduces the effective wage rate for low income wage earners (as welfare payments 
are phased out). Thus, income redistribution retards work incentives at both ends 
of the income distribution. This reduces the economic growth rate and ultimately 
the level of aggregate social utility. 
Furthermore, it is particularly likely that income redistribution programs will 
over-expand. Ideally, the government would scale income redistribution programs 
by balancing society's preferences for short run equity relative to long run eco-
nomic growth against the economy's capability to produce equity relative to eco-
nomic growth. Unfortunately, this tradeoff is virtually impossible to quantify. 
More importantly, transfer payments and other social welfare programs are typi-
cally examples of programs that benefit the majority at the expense of the minority. 
Under a progressive tax system, the burden of redistribution is concentrated on 
high income voters, while it benefits a broader range of lower income voters. Thus, 
social safety-net programs that start as small scale, temporary or emergency mea-
sures, naturally expand into permanent, large scale programs (e.g., Social Security, 
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Medicare and Medicaid in the U.S.). The broader based their benefits, the harder it 
is to control program expansion. The tendency for expansion is only reversed if 
economic growth is reduced sufficiently that voters are willing to accept drastic 
measures. 15 
PAST EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Past empirical studies concerning the relationship between government size and 
GDP growth have found mixed results. For example, Kormendi and Meguire 
( 1985) found no significant relationship between economic growth and either the 
growth in, or level of, government consumption expenditures relative to GDP. 
They studied 4 7 countries in the post-World War II period. However, other studies 
found a negative relationship between government size and GDP growth rates, as 
described above. For example, Grier and Tullock (1987) extended Kormendi and 
Meguire's analysis to 115 countries using pooled cross-section, time series data. 
They found a significantly negative relation between GDP growth rates and the 
government share of GDP for many OECD countries. Landau (1983) found a sim-
ilar relationship between government consumption expenditures as a percent of 
GDP and growth rates in GDP per capita for approximately 100 countries during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, though this relationship was not significant when lower 
income countries were considered independently. Similarly, Barro (1991) found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between GDP growth and govern-
ment consumption spending less expenditures on defense and education (because 
these expenditures are essentially public investment rather than public consump-
tion). He analyzed 98 countries over the period 1960-1985. 
In contrast, Ram (1986) examined the relationship between GDP growth rates 
and the growth in government consumption expenditures, in both absolute terms 
and relative to GDP. Ram found that the growth of government has a positive 
effect on GDP growth. He further found that government generates a positive 
externality on the rest of the economy and that factor productivity is higher in gov-
ernment activities than in the private market. However, he did find evidence that 
the positive effects of government consumption expenditures are weaker in higher 
income countries, such as those considered here. 
Finally, Levine and Renelt (1992) questioned the significance of all these 
results. They examined the relationship between GDP growth and several mea-
sures of government activity relative to GDP, including government consumption 
expenditures (as in Landau, 1983), total government expenditures, and govern-
ment consumption expenditures less defense and education (as in Barro, 1991). 
While they found a negative relationship between government activity and GDP 
growth, they found that the results were only statistically significant for particular 
choices of explanatory variables. They called the results "fragile," because they 
could not withstand small changes in the list of explanatory variables. Levine and 
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Renelt maintain that readers should not place confidence in statistical results 
unless they are 'robust' to changes in the list of explanatory variables. 
Finally, Barro (1990) suggests that the effect of government activity on eco-
nomic growth may depend on the level of government activity. Barro used an 
endogenous growth model with optimizing households to derive the growth maxi-
mizing level of government activity. For low levels of government expenditures 
relative to GDP, economic growth increases with government activity. For high 
levels of government expenditures relative to GDP, economic growth decreases 
with government activity. Economic growth is maximized at an intermediate level 
of government activity. 16 Karras (1996) estimated the growth maximizing level of 
government activity for different groups of countries. He assumed that economic 
growth is maximized when the marginal product of government expenditures 
equals unity (the "Barro rule"). Karras noted, among other things, that the optimal 
government size for OECD countries is approximately 14% of GDP(± 4%). He 
reached his conclusion using 1960-1985 data. 
The average share of the government consumption in GDP has been increasing 
since 1960 for all G7 countries (Figure 8). Most countries exceed Karras' optimal 
size range. The remaining countries are within Karras' optimal range. Thus, it 
would not be surprising to observe a negative relationship between government 
size and economic growth in OECD countries. However, previous empirical work 
considers only government consumption expenditures. It excludes transfer pay-
ments and social welfare programs. Transfer payments and social welfare pro-
grams may have a particularly important negative effect on economic growth. A 
more rigorous empirical study that distinguishes between government consump-
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tion and transfer payments might better characterize the relationship between gov-
ernment size and economic growth. 
Empirical Analysis: Government Outlays, 
Consumption Expenditures and Transfers 
Ideally, this empirical analysis would examine the relationship between total 
government activity and a comprehensive measure of economic impact. Total gov-
ernment activity would include government expenditures and the effects of legis-
lative, regulatory and bureaucratic measures. Unfortunately, data for broad 
measures of government activity and economic welfare are not readily available. 
As a compromise, quantifiable measures of government size and GDP (or per cap-
ita GDP) growth rates are used as proxies for total government and total economic 
impact, respectively. 
Three commonly cited measures of government size are reported here: total 
government disbursements as a percent of GDP, government consumption expen-
ditures as a percent of GDP, and government transfer payments as a percent of 
GDP. Each of these measures captures different elements of government interven-
tion. Total government disbursements is the broadest measure, including both gov-
ernment consumption expenditures and transfer payments, but excluding 
legislative, regulatory and bureaucratic activities. Government consumption 
expenditures measure those inputs used in providing goods and services. Govern-
ment transfer payments reflect efforts to redistribute income. 
The analysis presented here examines two hypothesis regarding government 
size and GDP growth rates. These hypotheses follow from the discussion above. 
This discussion suggested that the relationship between government size and GDP 
should be negative for higher income countries, but positive for lower income 
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countries. Furthermore, government income redistribution programs should have a 
stronger negative effect on GDP growth than government consumption expendi-
tures. The relationship between GDP growth and government outlays should lie 
between these two extremes, because government outlays include both consump-
tion expenditures and transfer payments. These relationships will be examined for 
OECD countries using data for the period 1977-1996. 17 
Over the period of interest, there was data on GDP, government outlays, gov-
ernment consumption expenditures and government transfers for 21 OECD mem-






Q.. 1.5% § 
~ 0.5% 
O"/o 20"/o 40"/o 60"/o 80"/o 
Government Disbursements as a percent of GDP 
Figure 9A. Real GDP Growth versus 
Government Disbursements as a Percent of GDP 
3.5% 
~ 3.0% 
J 2.5% 2.0% 
~ § 
~ 0.5% 
0% 20"/o 40% 60% 80% 
Government Transfers as a percent of GDP 
Source: OECD, National Accounts: Detailed Tables, Volume II, Table 6, various countries (1977-1996). 
Figure 98. Real GDP Growth versus 
Government Transfers as a Percent of GDP 
100% 
100"/o 
214 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL Vol. 1/No. 2/1998 
1977 GDP per capita, countries are combined into three groups: higher income 
OECD members, medium income OECD members and lower income OECD 
members. These groups will be used to examine if the effects of government size 
varies with income level. 
Figures 9A and 9B show the relationship between real GDP growth rates and 
both government disbursements and government transfers as a percent of GDP 
for high income OECD members over the period from 1977 to 1996. The data 
points in these figures plot the average GDP growth rates and the average gov-
ernment disbursements or government transfer payments as a percent of GDP for 
the eleven countries in this group. The trend lines were derived using linear 
regression analysis. The intercepts and slopes were all statistically sifnificant at 
the 95% level or above. The fit of the regression is indicated by the R value (the 
R 2 value shows the percent of the data variation explained by the estimated trend 
line, with 1.00 representing a perfect fit). As hypothesized, both of these figures 
shows a negative relationship between real GDP growth rates and government 
size. This is consistent with the hypothesis that increasing government size 
reduces economic growth. 
Comparing the trends in Figures 9A and 9B provides additional insight concern-
ing the nature of the interaction between GDP growth rates and government size. 
In these figures, the slopes of the trend lines indicate that the relationship between 
GDP growth and government size becomes increasingly negative as the measure 
of government size narrows from total disbursements to transfer payments. 
Because the vertical and horizontal axes have the same scale, the slope of the trend 
line can be observed visually. Mathematically, the slope of the trend line is indi-
cated by the coefficient of the xterm, as specified in Figures 9 A and 9B. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that income redistribution programs have a stron-
ger negative effect on GDP growth than government disbursements, which include 
both government consumption and transfer payments. 18 
Figures lOA and lOB show the relationship between real GDP growth rates and 
government disbursements as a percent of GDP for both low and high income 
OECD members over the period from 1977 to 1996. Again as hypothesized, the 
trends show a positive relationship for lower income OECD members, and a neg-
ative relationship for higher income OECD members. 19 It appears that government 
expenditures may provide valuable public infrastructure and stabilizing income 
redistribution for relatively low income countries.20 As countries develop, and the 
scope of government activity expands, government expenditures become a drag on 
GDP growth rates. In part, this may reflect the difficulty of controlling growth in 
government activity as the country develops. 
If the range of countries considered expands to either the 17 high and middle 
income OECD members, or the 10 middle and low income OECD members, the 
slope of the trend line becomes statistically insignificant. This indicates that gov-
ernment activity has the greatest impact on GDP growth rates for high income 
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(negative impact) and low income (positive impact) OECD members. The effect 
for middle income members is ambiguous. 
Finally, Figures l lA and l lB show the relationship between government dis-
bursements as a percent of GDP and the inflation and unemployment rates, respec-
tively, for the G7 countries plus Sweden. As expected, there is a positive 
relationship. Thus, increases in government size are consistent with decreases in 
economic growth and increases in both inflation and unemployment.21 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has described the expected long run relationship between government 
size and GDP growth, examined empirical data concerning this relationship, and 
used these results to analyze Japan's current efforts to reduce government size. The 
theoretical discussion and empirical evidence developed for this paper is consis-
tent with a negative relationship between government size and GDP growth for 
higher income countries. This is consistent with Japan's historical experience. 
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Japan has initiated four reform initiatives to limit government size since World 
War II, including the current reform effort. As discussed previously, the success of 
the three earlier reforms is indicated by the subsequent decreases in various mea-
sures of Japan's government size. Japan's success is also indicated by comparing 
international data. Japan has the highest average economic growth rate and lowest 
government size of the G7 countries over the period 1960-1995. However, a closer 
look at Japan's prior reforms indicates more mixed results. For example, the 1980s 
reforms failed to reduce and rationalize permits, licenses and inspection proce-
dures. They also failed to reinforce the cabinet's authority over individual minis-
tries and agencies. 
To shed further light on Japan's reform initiatives, this paper looked more 
closely at the long run relationship between government size and economic 
growth. Compared to their private market counterparts, government programs typ-
ically lack competition, profit incentives, quantitative output measures, and a link 
between production costs and consumer values. Thus, government expenditures 
are likely to distort private market incentives, use resources less efficiently than 
their private market counterparts, and to naturally tend to expand over time beyond 
the optimal size. 
Inefficiency and excessive growth are primarily checked by voter feedback as 
tax burdens become excessive relative to the associated benefits. Rational voters 
will choose to expand government programs until their marginal value of an incre-
mental unit becomes lower than the marginal cost they must pay for that unit. Con-
versely, rational voters will choose to decrease government programs if their 
marginal cost exceeds their marginal benefit. Unfortunately, the cost distribution is 
different than the benefit distribution in government programs. This creates two 
opposing constituencies: voters where rationality implies expanding government 
intervention and voters where rationality implies contracting government interven-
tion. 21 The political viability of expanding or contracting a particular government 
program depends on the relative size of the competing constituencies for that pro-
gram. As a result, the tendency to expand government programs is particularly 
acute in programs that benefit a majority of voters at the expense of a minority 
(e.g., Social Security, Medicare, social welfare programs). It becomes even more 
acute as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e., tax burdens become 
increasingly concentrated on a small group of voters). 
Considering this anatomy of government programs, the relationship between 
government consumption expenditures (including government investments in 
physical and human capital and the provision of public goods and services) and 
GDP growth is expected to be positive for developing countries and negative for 
industrialized countries. To a point, government physical and human capital 
investment and public goods and services provision can increase economic 
growth. However, industrialized countries are likely to have large governments 
relative to GDP and significant stocks of public physical and human capital. Thus, 
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government consumption expenditures are more likely to have expanded beyond 
the point where the marginal productivity of government programs is less than 
their private market counterparts. This uses resources inefficiently and reduces 
economic growth. 
In contrast, transfer payments and social welfare programs are likely to reduce 
economic growth for all countries, once they reach a relatively modest size. These 
programs reduce work incentives and encourage counterproductive tax avoidance 
activities. Once the social safety net is sufficient to forestall social unrest, labor 
force and tax avoidance effects reduce economic growth. 
These expected relationships are consistent with empirical data on economic 
performance and government size for 21 members of OECD considered here. The 
empirical results showed a negative relationship between several measures of gov-
ernment size and economic growth for higher income OECD members. More 
importantly, the relationship became more negative when the government size 
measure was narrowed from government disbursements to transfer payments. The 
effects of transfer payments and social welfare programs has not been explored in 
previous empirical work. 
Previous empirical work found conflicting evidence concerning the relationship 
between government size and GDP growth rates. Some studies found a negative 
relationship, others found a positive relationship, and still others found no statisti-
cally significant relationship. However, these studies included a much larger sam-
ple of countries (up to 100 or more), and combined countries in all development 
states. Unfortunately, as the sample size increases, data availability decreases. Of 
necessity, these studies used government consumption expenditures (less defense 
and education expenditures in some cases) to measure government size. This data 
does not include government transfer payments and social welfare programs. 
Thus, past empirical work used a broader sample of countries and a narrower mea-
sure of government size. In part, past ambiguous results might reflect the study 
design, which combined countries in different development stages and excluded 
transfer payments and social welfare programs. 
The more detailed description of the relationship between government size and 
economic growth developed here has at least two implications for government 
reform: reductions in government size are more likely with stagnant or declining 
economic growth rates, and government programs whose costs are widely shared 
are politically easier to reduce than government programs with widely shared ben-
efits and narrowly shared costs. These implications are consistent with the experi-
ence in Japan and other industrialized countries. 
It is easier to reduce government size if there is a strong external constituency 
supporting the reductions (e.g., a majority of voters). Typically, government 
bureaucrats have a stake in maintaining the status quo, or increasing government 
size. They bear significant economic burdens as government size is reduced, and 
reap significant benefits as it expands. Thus, significant reductions in government 
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operations are more plausible if supported by an external constituency. This con-
stituency is more likely to develop if there is a sense of crisis. Low economic 
growth rates, both in absolute terms and relative to other similar countries, foment 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Voters are more likely to support meaningful 
government size reductions if they are dissatisfied with the status quo. 
It is even more difficult to reduce government programs that benefit majority 
constituencies at the expense of minority constituencies. In this case, the majority 
constituency must recognize a clear connection between the perceived economic 
crisis and the minority constituency's burden. If not, the majority constituency 
would not support either the reform or the politicians and bureaucrats proposing 
the reform. 
For example, consider Japan's government reforms in the 1980s. These reforms 
were initiated primarily by Prime Minister Nakasone and his cabinet, in response 
to Japan's mounting public debt. However, Japan's average annual economic 
growth rate was a respectable 4.2% during this period, almost 50% higher than the 
second highest G7 country. Considering Japan's economic performance, govern-
ment reform did not generate the strong public reaction one would expect during 
an economic crisis. As such, the primary support did not spread from the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet to the general public. This limited the prospects for suc-
cess and helps explain both the failure to reduce and rationalize permits, licenses 
and inspection procedures and the inability to reinforce the cabinet's authority over 
individual ministries and agencies. Considering the central role Japanese bureau-
crats play in writing regulations, administering the law and adjudicating disputes, 
it is not surprising that Japan was unable to streamline the bureaucratic process and 
reduce the bureaucrats' autonomy without significant public support. 
Contrast the 1980s with Japan's current economic environment. Japan's aver-
age annual economic growth has fallen to 0.7% in the 1990s, the second lowest 
among the G7 countries and only half of the U.S. average annual growth rate. 
Japan's economy is faltering, both in absolute terms and relative to other similar 
countries. This has fostered a greater sense of economic crisis among the Japanese 
population. As such, the prospects for fundamental government reform are more 
promising. With a stronger sense of public support, economic reforms are more 
likely to prevail in reducing the bureaucracy's size and span of control.22 
Similar examples characterize government reforms in other countries. For 
example, the U.S. has been debating proposals for reducing the government budget 
deficit. However, the politicians are having trouble agreeing on the appropriate 
mixture of cuts in government programs and taxes. Medicare and other social wel-
fare programs are particularly troublesome. Concurrent with this debate, the U.S. 
has benefited from the highest average annual GDP growth rate among the G7 
countries. This alleviates the crisis mentality that characterized U.S. government 
reform debates in the late 1980s. Without a public sense of crisis, it is difficult to 
support drastic reductions in government programs, particularly Medicare and 
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other social welfare programs that benefit the majority constituency at the expense 
of the minority. 
Areas for Future Research 
Future research should focus on using an expanded database to verify or reject 
the hypotheses developed in this paper. In particular, testable hypotheses include: 
Government size has a negative impact on economic growth for industrialized 
countries, it has a positive impact on economic growth for lower income coun-
tries. 
Transfer payments and social welfare programs have a stronger negative effect on 
economic growth than government consumption expenditures. 
There is an inverse relationship between economic growth and initiatives to 
reduce government size; as growth decreases, there is increasing pressure to 
reduce government programs. 
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NOTES 
1. See Johnson, C. (1982); Ozaki, R. (1984); Itoh, M. (1995). 
2. The per capita GDP figures in dollar terms vary depending on whether the conversion is based 
on the currency exchange rate or purchasing power parity. The figures here are computed using 
1994 data and the then prevailing exchange rate. Japan's per capita GDP changes from the first 
to the second highest among G7 countries when the conversion is computed using purchasing 
power parity. Source: OECD IN FIGURES 1996 edition. 
3. Based on the most recent OECD data available (1994). For women's life expectancy, Japan 
leads OECD countries at 83 years followed by France at 81.8 years. For men's life expectancy, 
Iceland leads OECD countries at 77.1 years followed by Japan at 76.6 years. 
4. The real GDP in 1991 and 1996 were 448.9 trillion yen and 482 trillion yen, respectively, in 
1990 yen. Source: Long Term Credit Bank, Money Watch, May 1997. 
5. See K.L. Terasawa and W.R. Gates, Better Government Versus Less Government: Relation-
ships Between Government Size and Economic Growth, was published in Advances in Interna-
tional Comparative Management, Supplement 3: International Perspectives on the New Public 
Management, Lawrence R. Jones, Kuno Schedler and Stephen W. Wade, eds., JAi Press Inc., 
1997. 
6. Discussion in this section draws from an excellent account of the subject by Mitsutoshi Ito 
(1995) and Masahiko Aoki (1988), Suzumura and Okuno-Fujiwara (1991). 
7. See ltoh (1995). 
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8. Kamensky's Guiding Principle (1996). 
9. Levine and Renelt (1992, pp. 950--951) observe that government expenditures, taxes, etc., may 
or may not promote private sector efficiency and growth. Even if growth promoting, govern-
ment intervention may inappropriately distort private decisions. Finally, government programs 
may use resources ineffectively and inefficiently. None of these considerations can be captured 
in simple measures of government expenditures. 
10. See Wolf ( 1988) for a general discussion of imperfections in public goods provision. 
11. It is possible to identify the value of many government programs. Just as profit measures firm 
performance in private markets, the value of peace (e.g., the avoided cost of war) and the value 
of good health (e.g., the avoided cost of disease) measure national security and public health 
performance. However, productive inputs directly affect profitability in private markets, while 
inputs to national security and public health primarily affect the probabilities of peace and good 
health. Because we either observe peace (good health) or war (disease), it is difficult to deter-
mine the direct effect inputs have on the associated probabilities. In private markets, the value 
of inputs can be measured by observing the change in profits over time. To determine efficiency 
and optimality in public goods provision, we need to be able to measure the incremental impact 
of specific inputs, as with private market inputs. 
12. Competition for funds between programs and across agencies, as well as altruistic motives in 
government employees, also increase efficiency and counterbalance expansionary tendencies 
in government programs. 
13. A successful log-rolling arrangement, however, could effectively make programs that benefit a 
minority at the majority's expense as difficult to control as programs that benefit the majority 
at a minority's expense. 
14. This is consistent with the empirical studies that find low levels of government activity increase 
economic growth, while high levels decrease growth. For example, see Barro (1990) and Karras 
(1996). 
15. From society's viewpoint, growth reducing transfer payments and social welfare programs may 
be desirable. In choosing the appropriate level for these programs, it is important to balance 
their growth and equity implications. Without good information about their growth implica-
tions, it is impossible to make informed decisions regarding appropriate levels for income redis-
tribution programs. 
16. As observed by others, Barro acknowledges that maximizing growth may not maximize social 
well-being. He also develops a model where a "benevolent" government maximizes utility for 
a representative household. See Barro ( 1990: S 110-S 112). 
17. Data for this analysis is taken from OECD, National Accounts: Detailed Tables, Volume II, 
Tables 1 and 6, various countries and various years. 
18. The stronger negative impact of transfer payments also holds if the group of countries consid-
ered either narrows to the G7 countries plus Sweden or broadens to the high and middle income 
OECD members. In both cases, all coefficients are statistically significant and the R2 indicates 
a similar fit to the data. There is also a negative relationship between real GDP growth and gov-
ernment consumption as a percent of GDP for all three groups of countries: the high income 
OECD members, the G7 plus Sweden and the high and middle income OECD cpuntries. How-
ever, the slope of the trend line is not generally statisticlly significant and the relationship has a 
low R2. Thus, these results are not higlighted in the text. 
19. As stated above, both regression coefficients for the high income OECD members are statisti-
cally significant at the 95% level or above. For the low income OECD members, the slope of 
the trend line is statistically significant at the 95% level; the intercept term is not significantly 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level. As in Figure 9, the scales of the vertical and 
horizontal axes are the same in figures lOA and lOB. Thus, the relative strength of the relation-
ships can be observed visually by the slope of the trend lines. 
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20. The negative effect of transfer payments continues to prevail in lower income countries. To ver-
ify this result, data for government disbursements and transfer payments were used as indepen-
dent variables explaining average GDP growth. The regression analysis estimated the following 
relationship: Y = 0.02 + 0.23Xl - 0.22X2, where Y is the real average GDP growth rate, XI is 
government disbursements and X2 is transfer payments. All variables are significant at the 99% 
level and the R2 for the estimated relationship is 0.99. This indicates that government disburse-
ments have a negative effect for all countries. 
21. There are similar positive relationships between government employment as a percent of total 
employment and government consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP and both inflation 
and unemployment. As with GDP growth rates, the strongest positive relationship is found 
using government disbursements relative to GDP as the independent variable. Only this rela-
tionship is reported here. 
22. The analysis presented here considers long run economic performance. At any point in time, 
economies are also subject to short run fluctuations. Balancing long run goals and short run 
fluctuations requires balancing government policy measures. Reducing government size does 
not preclude policies to address short run fluctuations. However, the analysis presented here 
cautions against government policies that increase government regulations and bureaucracy or 
transfers and social welfare programs. 
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